WSJ: Как получить с России серьезную плату деньгами и кровью?

Рупор финансовой олигархии США "Wall Street Journal" опубликовал статью вице-президента военного мозгового центра "Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments" со следующими тезисами:

"Бойкот саммита G8 в Сочи, удар по карманам российский олигархии, международная изоляция России - это все хорошо, но недостаточно.  Кроме того необходимо обсудить военную составляющую...

Во-первых, нужно дать возможность вооружения F-16 в Польше ядерным оружием и впредь рассматривать их как часть ядерных миссий НАТО...

Во-вторых, НАТО следует усилить своих союзников на переднем крае - Польшу, Румынию, Эстонию, Латвию, Литву - конвенционным вооружением, включая, возможно, средства ПРО. Это понизит желание России нарушать их суверенность для защиты этнически русских, а также снизит потенциал для проведения операций подобных проведенных в Крыму...

В-третьих, НАТО и США следует рассмотреть непрямую военную помощь, подобную тому, что делало США в Афганистане в 80-х. Это может включать в себя поставки вооружения для атак силами сопротивления баз на украинской территории, занятых российской армией или ее прокси-структурами.  Возможно не совсем реально заставить Россию вывести войска, но вполне возможно получить с нее серьезную плату деньгами и кровью через нерегулярную войну...  

В четвертых, в посткрымскую эпоху Сирия теперь должна рассматриваться не только через призму соперничества Запада с Ираном, но и через возродившееся противостояние с Россией. Поражение режима Ассада с потенциальной потерей Россией морского порта в Тартусе станет серьезным налогом...

И, последнее - украинский кризис поднимает фундаментальные вопросы о целесообразности ядерного разоружения и перезагрузки с Россией, продвигаемых администрацией Обамы..."

ИСТОЧНИК

П.С.  Так как полный оригинал по подписке, даю копию здесь:

Russia's seizure of Crimea should be a wake-up call for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The absence of serious thinking about NATO's territorial defense mission—its raison d'être—and the weakness its 28 member nations have shown since the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia have proven catnip for Vladimir Putin.

Most of NATO's European members have spent the past two decades rationalizing how they can spend ever-smaller sums on security. And now the U.S. is cutting its defense expenditures while trying to "pivot" its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. So it isn't surprising that pundits and government officials have tended to emphasize political and economic suasion for dealing with this latest Russian aggression.

Sanctions, skipping the G-8 summit in Sochi, hitting Russian oligarchs in their pocketbooks, isolating Russia in international forums—all of these options are legitimate responses to Mr. Putin's land grab in the sovereign state of Ukraine. But there is also a need to think about military options.

First, NATO should reconsider its so-called Three Nos from the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Three Nos were shorthand for the NATO allies' joint declaration that they had "no intentions, no plans, and no reason" to station nonstrategic nuclear forces in new member states. But NATO left the door open to future deployments if front-line allies were threatened. While NATO still lacks the intention and plans to station nuclear forces in new member states, such as Poland, it now has more than sufficient reason to do so.

A preliminary step should be making the Polish air force's F-16s capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons so that they could participate in NATO's nuclear mission. That should quickly be followed by site surveys to identify suitable locations for potentially storing nuclear weapons on the territory of front-line allies, including Poland, if relations with Russia further deteriorate.

Second, NATO should reinforce its front-line allies with additional conventional force deployments. The time has come for the U.S. and other NATO allies to consider permanently stationing forces in Poland and Romania as well as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to back up their words of strategic solidarity. Their mission should be defensively oriented, establishing what military strategists call "anti-access, area denial" zones. (This might include missile defenses to protect major bases in those countries along with anti-air, anti-armor and anti-ship weapons to counter air, land or naval incursions.

Taking these steps in the Baltic states would reduce Russia's temptation to encroach on their sovereignty in the name of "protecting ethnic Russian populations," a pretext it has used in Ukraine. It would also preclude Russia's option of a quick, Crimea-like operation to establish a fait accompli on the ground before NATO can decide to act.

Third, NATO should make it clear that it would seriously consider a future Ukrainian request for indirect military assistance, especially if Russia escalates the crisis in Crimea or deploys its forces into other eastern Ukrainian provinces. NATO could certainly provide overt nonlethal and humanitarian assistance, while the U.S. might even consider covert lethal aid, as in Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet occupation. This might include short-range precision guided weapons that could be used by resistance forces to attack bases and facilities on Ukrainian territory seized by Russia's forces or its proxies.

It may not be realistic to compel the withdrawal of Russian forces quickly and it is far-fetched to imagine NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it would still be possible to exact a heavy toll on Russia in blood and treasure through a protracted irregular war if it formally annexes Crimea or attempts to occupy other parts of the country.

Fourth, the U.S. and its NATO allies should revisit their self-imposed prohibitions on lethal aid to moderate Syrian opposition groups. In the post-Crimea era, Syria should be viewed through the prism of not only the West's long-term strategic competition with Iran, but also its re-emerging competition with Russia. The defeat of Bashar Assad's murderous regime and with it the potential loss of Russia's naval port at Tartus would represent a heavy tax for Russia's adventurism closer to home.

Lastly, Russia's invasion of Crimea should prompt strategic reappraisals in both Washington and Brussels. The Ukrainian crisis raises fundamental questions about the wisdom of the Obama administration's attempt to "lead from behind" on foreign-policy issues with clear U.S. interests, its pursuit of "global zero" (the elimination of all nuclear weapons world-wide) and most directly its "reset with Russia."

Rather than "reset," the administration would do well to hit the "recall" button on the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, released March 4, which treated Putin's Russia as an afterthought relative to other global threats, and astonishingly advocated another round of bilateral nuclear-arms reductions at a time of heightened tensions.

Leaders in Washington and Europe have allowed NATO's defenses to deteriorate to the point that Mr. Putin seems to think he can act with impunity. It is past time to start rebuilding those defenses, and Mr. Putin's Ukrainian gambit should be the catalyst.

Mr. Thomas is vice president and director of studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.